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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

JURISDICTION OF MARYLAND COURTS OVER
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS UNDER THE
ACT OF 1937
By G. KENNETH REIBLICH*
In the Laws of 1937, Ch. 504, the Maryland legislature
made an extentive revision of the corporation laws with
reference to the assertion of jurisdiction of the Maryland
Courts over foreign corporations.1 The new statute eliminates certain provisions of the old law;2 consolidates certain features concerning domestic and foreign corporations;8 enlarges upon the means of service formerly allowed ;4 and makes more explicit in several instances, and
expands definitely in others the jurisdiction that may be
exercised over foreign companies. In doing this, however,
the law may encroach upon territory already constitutionally closed by United States Supreme Court decision. In
some instances, it enters undiscovered, or at least unclaimed regions of doubtful constitutionality. In one respect it may fail to provide completely for what it seeks
to attain. This article accordingly devotes itself to a careful analysis of the law to determine what it seeks to accomplish by way of allowing judicial jurisdiction over foreign corporations, and what are the salient constitutional
questions raised thereby.
* A.B., 1925, Ph.D., 1928, Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1929, New
York University; LL.M., 1937, Columbia Law School; Professor of Law,
University of Maryland; Assistant Editor of the REVIEW.
' This article confines itself to the problems of judicial jurisdiction raised
by the new statute. It should be observed, however, that Ch. 504 made
substantial changes in other phases of the Maryland corporation law. For
a discussion of these changes, see Myerberg, Revision of the Maryland
Corporation Law, The Daily Record, Oct. 15, 1937. Also, on the phases
of the law's validity, see the two opinions of the Attorney General in The
Daily Record, Sept. 10, 1937, and Nov. 10, 1937. An analysis of the qualification and Jurisdiction provisions of the statute appears in note (1938)
38 Col. L. Rev. 1060.
2 Md. Laws 1937, Ch. 504, Sec. 3.
The chief sections dealing with jurisdiction that were repealed without any form of re-enactment were: Art.
56, Sec. 162; and Art. 73, Sec. 31 (dealing respectively with service on telegraph and express companies and service on the Adams Express Co.) ; cf.
the new statute, Md. Laws 1937, Ch. 504, Sec. 124.
3 Compare the old and new sections of the Code covered by Md. Laws
1937, Ch. 504, Sec. 4; or see Myerberg, op. cit. supra note 1.
6 The present notice provisions are discussed infra note 107. They can
be compared to the Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Maryland Annotations,
Sec. 92 (1937), prepared prior to the new statute. Also, cf. Myerberg, op.
cit. aupra note 1.
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What the law seeks to accomplish by way of allowing judicial jurisdiction is set forth as the new Section 118 of
Maryland Code, Article 23.1 It reads:
"118 (a) Every foreign corporation doing intrastate or interstate or foreign business in this State
shall be subject to suit in this State by a resident or
non-resident of this State on any cause of action arising out of such business and on any other cause of
action.

"(b) Every foreign corporation which has heretofore done or hereafter does intrastate or interstate
or foreign business in this State shall be subject to
suit in this State by a resident or non-resident of this

State on any cause of action arising out of such business, whether or not such foreign corporation has
ceased to do business in this State.
"(c) Every foreign corporation shall be subject
to suit in this State by a resident of this State or by
a person who has a usual place of business in this
State on any cause of action arising out of a contract
made or liability incurred, within or without this
State, if when such contract was made or such liability
was incurred such foreign corporation was doing intrastate or interstate or foreign business in this State,
whether or not such foreign corporation shall have
ceased to do business in this State.
"(d) Every foreign corporation shall be subject
to suit in this State by a resident of this State or by
a person having a usual place of business in this State
on any cause of action arising out of a contract made
within this State or liability incurred for acts done
within this State, whether or not such foreign corporation is doing or has done business in this State."
The jurisdiction asserted here breaks up readily into
three parts: (1) a general jurisdiction to be asserted over
all foreign corporations "doing business" in Maryland,
regardless of where the cause of action arose, and regard5 Md. Code (1924) as amended, Laws 1937, Ch. 504. Future references
to the statute are to the law as amended in 1937, unless the contrary is

indicated.
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less of where the plaintiff is a resident ;6 (2) a continuance
of such jurisdiction after the corporation has ceased to
do business in Maryland, as to causes of action arising out
of business done in Maryland, or in favor of Maryland residents and others with a usual place of business in Maryland;7 (3) jurisdiction for any cause of action arising out
of any act done in Maryland, whether or not the corporation is regularly doing business, if plaintiff is a resident
or has a usual place of business in Maryland.'
Each of these parts raises certain distinct (although
at times over-lapping) constitutional questions, of possible
"due process" or "commerce clause" objection. And,
with reference to each, the answer may be affected by
whether or not the corporation has qualified or registered
(and appointed a resident agent for receipt of service) as
required by section 119 of the law. Accordingly, discussion is divided so as to indicate as clearly as possible
whether the provisions of each major part of section 118
may violate either the due process clause or the commerce
clause with reference to either the qualifying or the nonqualifying corporation. After that, and supplementary to
it, attention will be given to the notice provisions of the
statute, the validity of which should be generally the same
for each of the phases of jurisdictional power discussed.
They would seem to be constitutional as far as they go,
but they possibly fail to provide an appropriate means of
service with reference to the third class of jurisdiction
9
mentioned earlier.
GENERAL JURISDICTION, SEC. 118(A)

Sec. 118(a), Due Process Objection, Qualifying Corporation
The Maryland statute requires the appointment of a
resident agent for receipt of service of process as a preSubdivision (a).
7 Subdivisions (b) and (c). This would seem to be the primary purpose
of these subdivisions. However, because of their wording they might be
construed to cover also specialized instances of the assertion of jurisdictional power while the corporation is still within the state; see infra circa
note 81.
3 Subdivision (d).
9 Infra, discussion of Secs. 105-109, circa note 107.
8
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liminary to "qualification" for the foreign corporation
engaged in intrastate business or "registration" for the
corporation engaged in interstate business.' 0 This provision, when coupled with the notice provisions allowing
for service where such resident agent has not been appointed," immediately suggests that the provisions of section 118 can apply: (1) to jurisdiction asserted over corporations that have qualified and appointed the required
agent; or, (2) to corporations that have ignored section
119 and have not appointed the agent.
This distinction between the qualifying and non-qualifying corporation might be eliminated by a construction of
the statute to the effect that compliance with section 119
would not be deemed a consent to a jurisdiction not other10Sec. 119. Space has not permitted in this article a complete discussion
of the problem of whether the mere requirement of "registration" (as
such) imposes an unreasonable (and hence unconstitutional) burden on Interstate commerce. The differentiation from "qualification" was an attempt
to indicate that the law did not mean to subject the corporation engaged
In interstate business to the same extent as one engaged In intrastate
business. However, the only difference apparent on the face of the law Is
that "registration" does not require the filing of a charter or the payment
of the tax attached to "qualification". Both "qualification" and "registration" require the appointment of a resident agent for receipt of service
and consequently subjection to jurisdiction as allowed in Sec. 118. The
same penalties attach to failure to "register" as attach to "failure to
qualify". While it is admitted that the mere fact of requiring "registration" and the consequent maintenance of an agent for receipt of service
might of Itself be burdensome, it is believed that in many instances this
would not be true unless the jurisdiction allowed for by service on such
agent were burdensome. To that extent the material discussed subsequently in the text of this article is important to consider in determining
the validity of the "registration" provision. It would seem that the same
approach should be taken to determine the validity of the sanctions Imposed by the law, Secs. 121-122.
This approach, in weighing heavily the purpose of registration and of
the penalties for non-registration in order to answer the problem of their
validity as applied to corporations engaged solely In interstate commerce,
emphasizes the facts, along with the words, of cases such as DahnkeWalker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 66 L. ed. 239, 42 S. Ct. 106
(1921); and Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197, 59 L. ed. 193, 35
S. Ct. 57 (1914). However, the latter case Indicates that the penalty provision of Sec. 121 (c) when coupled with Secs. 118 and 119 may be inapplicable to a corporation in interstate business, unless Sec. 118 Is interpreted much more narrowly than it reads. Cf. infra circa notes 75, 79.
This is predicated upon the fact that the jurisdiction provisions of Sec. 118
are too broad as applied to the corporation engaged in interstate commerce
and not that every requirement of "registration" as such is bad. This Is
further reason for greater segregation of the types of jurisdiction covered
In Sec. 118 as suggested from time to time in this article. For more
detailed consideration of the problem here discussed, see: Myerberg, op. cit.
supra note 1; and note (1938) 38 Col. Law Rev. 1060.
11 Secs. 105 (b), (c), (d), as amended 1937.

1938]

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

wise present. Such a construction has been given by the
Attorney General.lla But under the cases to date, compliance with the qualification sections of such a law has
been taken to be consent to the jurisdiction provisions.
Because such a construction would not be impossible here,
this article segregates the qualifying from the non-qualifying corporation.
As to the qualifying corporation, the prevailing present
opinion would be that the provisions of the Maryland law
are entirely valid as far as the "due process" objection is
concerned, even though qualification is taken to be consent to jurisdiction.12 In such case, jurisdiction is said
to rest upon the express consent of the foreign corporation and may be asserted as broadly as the law allows.
This rests mainly upon the case of Pennsylvania Fire Isurance Co. v. Gold Issue M. & M. Co.,"3 where, under a
statute not clearly applying to all causes of action, the
state courts interpreted the law as covering causes of action arising outside as well as within the jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court of the United States, in sustaining this construction in a case where suit was brought on a cause of
action arising outside of the state and over the objection
of a foreign corporation which had appointed the superintendent of insurance its agent as required by the law,
said:
"The construction of the Missouri Statute thus
adopted hardly leaves a constitutional question open.
The defendant had executed a power of attorney that
made service on the superintendent the equivalent of
personal service. If by a corporate vote it had accepted service in this specific case, there would be no
doubt of the jurisdiction of the state court over a
transitory action of contract. If it had appointed an
agent authorized in terms to receive service in such
case, there would be equally little doubt. New York,
L. E. & M. R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U. S. 591, 37 L. Ed.
11

a Supra note 1.

12 Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934),

Sec. 91; Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws (2nd ed. 1938), Sec. 73; Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935), Sees. 89.4
91.1.
13 243 U. S. 93, 61 L. ed. 610, 37 Sup. Ct. 344 (1917).
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292, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444. It did appoint an agent in
language that rationally might be held to go to that
length, and the construction did not deprive the defendant of due process of law even if it took the defendant by surprise, which we have no warrant to
assert."
Other statutes have been construed in a similar way."4
The Maryland statute calls for no construction, but is explicit on its face in extending jurisdiction to suit by "a
resident or a non-resident" to causes of action arising out
of business done in Maryland or to "any other causes of
action". The only problem is whether the Pennsylvania
v. Gold Issue case, as is generally assumed, excludes all
possibility of attack by the qualifying corporation.
A possible basis of attack would seem to lie in some
future application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. This doctrine may be briefly stated that although
a state has power to exclude the foreign corporation altogether, it may not make the surrender of a constitutional
right the condition of entry and continuance within the
state.1 5 Presently, in considering the jurisdiction that may
be asserted over the non-complying corporation where
power must rest solely on "doing business," we shall observe certain cases that have said (and have been construed to hold) that jurisdiction is limited by the "due
process" clause to causes of action arising within the state.
Could it not be argued that, to the extent this is true,
there is an unconstitutional condition imposed in making
a consent to any broader jurisdiction a condition of entry
" Johnston v. Trade Ins. Co., 132 Mass. 432 (1882) ; Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N. Y. 432, 111 N. W. 1075, L. R. A.
1916 F, 407, Am. Cas. 1918 A. 389 (1916) (not an exhaustive list); ef.
Hagerstown Brewing Co. v. Gates, 117 Md. 348, 83 A. 570 (1912); In the
absence of such constructions by the state courts, or of express words,
the Supreme Court of the United States has manifested a construction
preference to limit jurisdiction to causes of action arising within the
state of suit; Morris & Co. et al. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U. S. 405,
49 S. Ct. 360, 73 L. ed. 762 (1929), and cases therein cited.
"' For criticism of stating this doctrine too broadly and a good summary
of the cases see: Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional
Rights (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 321. See also: Merrill, UnconstitutionalConditions (1929) 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 879; Henderson, The Position of Foreign
Corporationsin American Constitutional Law (1918) 147; Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1 (1910).
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to do business ?1 There seems an inconsistency, otherwise,
between the "due process" objection as applied to jurisdiction based on doing business and jurisdiction rested on
consent as a result of the appointment of an agent.
However, it is believed that the Supreme Court is more
likely to extend the power resting on "doing business"
than to contract the "consent" jurisdiction already enunciated very clearly in its decisions. 7 To the extent this
is true, section 118 (a) may be accepted for the present
as valid as to the corporation engaging in intrastate business that has assented to its provisions by the appointment of an agent under section 119.
Sec. 118(a), Due Process Objection, Non-Qualifying
Corporation
As applied to corporations which have not complied
with the qualification provisions of section 119, nor consented in any other manner to the application of section
118, the provisions of the law raise several constitutional
questions. Subdivision (a) emphasizes three separate factors: (1) "doing business," (2) the nature of the cause
of action (as arising out of business done or otherwise),
(3) the party plaintiff's being "resident or non-resident",
each of which may have a definite constitutional significance.
"Doing business" is clearly necessary because it is
generally accepted law that in the absence of express consent, the foreign corporation may not be sued except in
the state where it is doing business.'
This has been said
14 In speaking of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in an "equal
protection of the laws" case, the Court, in Power Manufacturing Co. v.
Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 496, 47 S. Ct. 678, 71 L. ed. 1165 (1927) used
language broad enough to support this. It said: "The contention advanced by counsel for the plaintiff that the defendant impliedly assented
to the venue provisions is answered and refuted by repeated decisions
holding that a foreign corporation by seeking and obtaining permission to
do business in a state does not thereby become obligated to comply with,
or estopped from objecting to, any provision in the state statute, which
is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States." But cf. Washington v. Superior Ct., 289 U. S. 361, 53 S. Ct. 624, 77 L. ed. 1256, 89 A. L. R.
653 (1933), as indicating possible reluctance to apply the doctrine to a
service situation.
17 Cf. articles infra note 44.
18 Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U- S. 189, 35
S. Ct. 509, 59 L. ed. 910 (1915) ; Restatement Conflict of Laws, Sec. 89:
I Beale, op. cit. note 12, Sec. 83.
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to call for more than the doing of a single act (at least
when a general jurisdiction for all purposes is asserted)1 9
both by the Supreme Court of the United States2 ° and by
the Maryland Court of Appeals. 21 The former has emphasized the importance of "doing business" as a jurisdiction basis in cases denying jurisdiction because an officer or agent is casually within the state,2 2 or resides within the state 23 or has come into the state to attend to an affair of the corporation.24
Just how much need be done in the state before the
concept is satisfied presents more of a problem. The Supreme Court has attempted definition, saying that the corporation is subject to the jurisdiction of the state if it is
doing business "such in character and extent as to warrant
the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to
the jurisdiction and the laws of the district in which it is
served" ;25 or elsewhere, that it is business carried on by the
corporation "in such sense as to manifest its presence. ' ' 26
A survey of all the decisions, 27 can result in no better conclusion than that this term, when used as a basis for a
general jurisdiction over the foreign corporation, describes
some consistent course of activity in the state, or some single act looking forward to continued activity there. 2 When
such act or activity is of such character that the Court feels
it is reasonable to assert jurisdiction (in the absence of express consent or any basis other than the activity) the
19As distinguished from a jurisdiction specially limited to a cause of
action arising out of the act done to be discussed with reference to Sec.
118 (d), infra.
20 Cf. Rosenberg Bros. and Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516, 43
S. Ct. 170, 67 L. ed. 372 (1923); Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190
U. S. 406, 23 S. Ct. 728, 47 L. ed. 1113 (1903) ; also supra note 18.
21 Crook v. Girard Iron Co., 87 Md. 138, 39 A. 94, 67 Amer. St. Rep. 325

(1898).
22

Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 37 S. Ct.
280, 61 L. ed. 710 (1917).
2 Dan River Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 35 S. Ct. 579, 59 L. ed.
910 (1915).
2, Rosenberg Bros. and Co. v. Curtis Brown & Co., 260 U. S. 516, 43 S. Ct.
170, 67 L. ed. 372 (1923).
2' St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U. S.218, 33 S. Ct. 245,
57 8L. ed. 486 (1913).
6International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944,
58 L. ed. 1479 (1914).
27 See: Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business (1925), 25 Col. L. Rev.
1018, 1024.
21Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 167 (a).
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Court says the corporation is "doing business"; otherwise,
not "doing business". This latter approach of reasonableness would seem to be a proper recognition of the
"due process" character of the problem although it has
received little explicit acceptance in judicial decision. Judge
Learned Hand, in Hutchinson v. Chase and Gilbert,2 9 comes
closest to recognition of it, where, in concluding his argument, he says:
"... But a single transaction is certainly not
enough whether a substantial business subjects the
corporation to jurisdiction generally, or only as to
local transactions. There must be some continuous
dealings in the state of the forum; enough to demand
a trial away from its home.
"This last appears to us to be really the controlling
consideration, expressed shortly by the word 'presence', but involving an estimate of the inconveniences
which would result from requiring it to defend, where
it has been sued. We are to inquire whether the extent and continuity of what it has done in the state in
question makes it reasonable to bring it before one
of its courts."
and later in his argument:
"None of this, and not all of it, seems to us a good
reason for drawing the defendant into a suit away from
its home state. In the end there is nothing more to
be said than that all the defendant's local activities,
taken together, do not make it reasonable to impose
such a burden upon it. It is fairer that the plaintiffs
should go to Boston than that the defendant should
come here. Certainly such a standard is no less vague
than any that the courts have hitherto set up; one may
look from one end of the decisions to the other and
find no vade mecum."
It might be noted that the term "doing business" is a
relative term and might require less activity within the
state so as to support service of process, than to render
the corporation amenable to taxation, or to the qualification
2045 Fed. (2d)
139 (1930) ; see also:. Farmers & Merchants. Bank v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 286 Fed. 566 (1922).
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statutes. 0 The extent to which this variability should exist would seem to depend upon the extent to which there
are substantial variations in the purpose for which the
term is used. In a recent commentary on the Maryland
statute here in question, the opinion is expressed that there
is no substantial difference in the purpose of the qualification section 119, so as to justify a different definition
there from that used for section 118:31
"... The apparent reason for a stricter interpretation of the phrase for purposes of qualification is
the greater harshness in excluding from the state a
corporation not engaged in regular activities because
it will not qualify. But since the principal statute
provides for no exclusion even of the corporation doing intrastate business, and since its requirement for
qualification is primarily, and that for registration is
solely, for the purposes of facilitating service, it would
seem logical that no greater test of "doing business"
should be applied to Section 119 requiring a resident
agent than to Section 118 providing for the assumption of jurisdiction."
This seems to be sound reasoning. That it may be a
correct prophecy of the interpretation to be expected under the Maryland Statute could be suggested from a recent case. In Lime Co. v. Wolfenden 2 the Court of Appeals
indicated a certain fixedness for the concept "doing business" when it accepted as authoritative in the interpretation of the local venue statutes the Supreme Court's interpretation of "doing business" as a basis of jurisdicin Peotion to support service of process as established
88
Co.
Tobacco
American
v.
Co.
Tobacco
ple's
In whatever fashion, however, one solves the problem
of what amounts to "doing business" as a jurisdictional
concept under holdings to date, it may be assumed that the
inquiry with reference to section 118(a) of the Maryland
Statute is solely for the purpose of delimiting its intended
application. The fact that the terms "regularly doing
8o Isaacs, 8upra note 27; note (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1060, 1066; Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 267, 268, 115 N. E. 915, 917 (1917).
81 (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1060, 1060.
I 171 Md. 299, 303, 188 Atl. 794 (1937), noted (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 165.
88 246 U. S. 79, 38 S. Ct. 288, 235, 62 L. ed. 587 (1918).
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business," as used in the old law, have been reduced in
the present section to "doing business" would not seem
to effect any change in the corporations to be covered
The cases interpreting the old statute 5 inthereby."
dicated an intention in the statute to assert power as fully
as the limits of due process of law allowed. The new statute could go no further if it intended to. Its continued
use of the term "doing business" would seem to be an indication of an intent to stay within the meaning of the
Court for purposes of
concept as defined by the Supreme
86
power.
jurisdictional
of
assertion
Not so, however, as to the second factor: i. e. where the
ca'use of action arose. Although no limitation has appeared in the Maryland decisions, and the prior statute in
its terminology expressed none,87 there is a strong current
opinion that the United States Supreme Court decisions
preclude the assertion of jurisdiction, based merely upon
"doing business," unless such jurisdiction is limited to
causes of action arising within the state. 88 Such is the assertion of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws89 and the view of
Professor Beale in his recent work on the same subject. 0
Subdivision (a), however, is worded so as seemingly to include causes of action arising outside of Maryland as well
as those arising out of business done in Maryland. 1 An
inquiry, therefore, as to the basis for the conclusions ac3,Cf. contra, note (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1060, 1066.
31Central of Georgia R. R. Co. v. Eichberg, 107 Md. 363, 68 A. 690, 14
L. R.A. (N. S.) 389 (1908) ; for other cases, Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
Maryland Annotations (1937) See. 167.
81 The Attorney General has expressed such an opinion, The Daily Record,
Nov. 10, 1937; op. cit. supra note 1.
87 Hagerstown
Brewing Co. v. Gates, 117 Md. 348, 83 Atl. 570 (1912);
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Maryland Annotations (1937), Sec. 392 (c)
Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 118.
11 Such was accepted as law in note (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1060, 1068,
in a comment on the Maryland statute; also infra notes 39, 40.
8 Sec. 92.
,0Op. cit. supra note 12, 89.4.
,1Sec. 118, of course, could be construed as applying only to corporations
that had complied with Sec. 119. That would seem inconsistent, however,
with the service provisions of the law which make provision for service on
the non-qualifying as well as the qualifying corporation. Also, it would
mean that the corporation doing business in Maryland in violation of Sec.
119, would not be subject to the process of the Courts. Such construction
is unlikely. There could be also a construction that the words "and on
any other cause of action" meant to cover only those arising In Maryland; but, this does not seem likely, nor Is It consistent with subdivision
(c).
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cepted by the Restatement of Conflict of Laws is pertinent to a determination of how far the Maryland law may
operate against the non-qualifying corporation as to causes
of action arising outside of Maryland.
Old Wayne Life Ass'n. v. McDonough4 2 and Simon v.
Southern Railway Co.,4" are the cases taken as supporting
the doctrine that if the foreign corporation has not complied with the state statute, a suit can be valid only as to
causes of action arising within the state. Definitely, such
a statement of their holding goes beyond their facts and
is not a necessary consequence of their reasoning.
In the Old Wayne case, suit was brought in Indiana upon
a Pennsylvania judgment against an Indiana insurance
company. The Indiana company contested the validity of
the judgment as violating the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and ultimately was sustained in
this contention by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Pennsylvania judgment was obtained in a suit on a
policy of insurance issued in Indiana upon the life of a
Pennsylvania resident for the benefit of Pennsylvania residents. Service in the suit was on the State Insurance Commissioner under the Pennsylvania Statute which provided
for service on a corporation designated agent or on the
insurance commissioner if the corporation had not appointed an agent. The old Wayne Life Ass'n. did business in Pennsylvania, but had not qualified by appointing
an agent for receipt of service. The statute did not require the Insurance Commissioner to send notice of any
kind to the company and it was not shown that any notice
was sent. It is apparent that this want of provision for
any kind of notice could have been the real basis for the
4
Supreme Court's due process holding. "
's204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51 L. ed. 345 (1907).
236 U. S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59 L. ed. 492 (1915).
Cf. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. ed. 446 (1928);
Consolidated Flour Mills v. Muegge, 127 Okla. 295, 260 P. 745 (1927), reversed in 278 U. S. 559, 49 S. Ct. 17, 73 L. ed. 505 (1928). Commentators
recognize the interpretation stated in the text: Farrier, Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Corporations (1932), 17 Minn. L. Rev. 270, 289, 292; Foster. Place
of Trial in Civil Actions (1930), 43 Har. L. Rev. 1217, 1225, 1230; Stimson,
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1933), 18 St. Louis Law Rev. 195,
204; note, Progress in Interstate Adjiustment of the Place of Trial of Civil
Corporations (1936) 45 Yale 1100, 1113.
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It is very possible that a court working on a theory of
jurisdiction based on implied consent resulting from doing
business might be willing to apply it to causes of action
arising within the state even though notice were lacking
(it could be argued that this lack resulted solely from the
Company's failure to exercise its privilege to appoint);
would be unwilling to imply such consent as to causes arising outside the state (thus explaining the wording of the
above opinion along those lines); and yet be willing to support jurisdiction as to all causes if adequate notice is provided for (as in the Maryland law). A reading of the
opinion, with this in mind, will reveal nothing that necessarily calls for the broader interpretation usually given to
it. The case can also be explained away on its facts, as
being nothing more than a holding that the statute involved
did not cover the type of jurisdiction asserted. 5
The facts of the Simon case were not substantially different from those in the Old Wayne case, except that the
cause of action arose in tort. Suit was brought in Louisiana against a Virginia corporation which had not complied
with the Louisiana statutes requiring the appointment of
an agent for receipt of service, and a default judgment was
obtained for damages arising out of a railroad accident
outside of Louisiana while the injured party was traveling on a ticket from Selma, Alabama, to Meridian, Mississippi. Service was made on an assistant to the Secretary of
State under the statute providing for service on the Secretary of State in such case. No provision was made for
the Secretary of State to send notice to the corporation,
and the corporation received no notice of the suit until
after the judgment was rendered. It then brought a proceeding in the United States District Court for Louisiana
to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment and ultimately
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the issuance
of such injunction.4 6
",Farrier and Foster, both supra note 44.
"6The language of this case in referring to the Old Wayne case is particularly strong in leading to the conclusion adopted by Mr. Beale and the
Restatement. The court said: "But this power to designate by statute the
officer upon whom service in suits against foreign corporations may be
made relates to business and transactions within the jurisdiction of the
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Read carefully, this case, like the Old Wayne case, can
be limited to being a decision based on the inadequacy of
the notice provided for. 7 With the holdings of both cases
so limited, the law could be analyzed as being that due
process of law does not prevent a state from asserting jurisdiction as to any cause of action against a foreign corporation, with "doing business" within the state as the
base of jurisdictional power, so long as appropriate notice
is provided for.
The problem has not been presented directly to the
United States Supreme Court since the Old Wayne and
Simon cases, although there is one citation of them strongly supporting the interpretation followed by the Restate48
ment.
On the other hand, there are certain earlier United
States Supreme Court cases and some state decisions which
would lend support to the interpretation of the Simon and
Old Wayne decisions as being notice decisions with jurisdiction allowable for all causes based merely on "doing business", if the notice given to the corporation is adequate.
50
49
Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, Railroad Co. v. Harris,
and New York L. E. & M. R. Co. v. Estill5 1 seem to recognize, on their facts at least, that jurisdiction may be asserted over a foreign corporation based solely upon its
"doing business" within the state even though the cause
of action arose elsewhere, if the service is on a corporate
official. The New York Court of Appeals, with Judge Carstate enacting the law. Otherwise, claims on contracts wherever made and
suits for torts wherever committed might by virtue of such compulsory
statute be drawn to the jurisdiction of any state in which the foreign
corporation might at any time be carrying on business. The manifest inconvenience and hardship arising from such extraterritorial extension of
jurisdiction, by virtue of the power to make such compulsory appointments,
could not defeat the power if in law it could be rightfully exerted. But
these possible inconveniences serve to emphasize the importance of the
principle laid down in Old Wayne Life Association v. McDonough, 204
U. S. 22, that the statutory consent of a foreign corporation to be sued
does not extend to causes of action arising in other states."
17 Supra note 44.
,8Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 49 S. Ct.
329, 73 L. ed. 711 (1929).
411170 U. S. 100, 18 S. Ct. 526, 42 L. ed. 964 (1898).
10 12 Wall 65, 20 L. ed. 354 (1870).
Cf. New England
51147 U. S. 591, 13 S. Ct. 444, 37 L. ed. 292 (1893).
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U. S. 138, 4 S. Ct. 364, 28 L. ed.
379 (1884).
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dozo writing the opinion, held the same, making the service
on the corporate official a basis of distinction from the Old
Wayne and Simon cases.5 2 The result of these cases and
other state cases holding similarly" would seem to be
sound, but it would not seem that they should be distinguished on the ground stated.
The distinction lies between good and bad notice. "Doing business "is the basis of jurisdictional power and must
be present in all cases to support the jurisdiction in the
absence of corporate consent; but, if present it will be
sufficient for all causes if adequate notice is given. This
notice is adequate if service be made on a responsible corporate official. It is obviously inadequate if made on a
statutory designated state official without provisions for
him to forward notice (the Simon and Old Wayne cases).
It would seem to be adequate if made on a statutory designated official if the statute requires adequate steps to be
taken by him to notify the corporation.54 The Maryland
statute provides for this5 5 and would seem to be good, if
the Simon and Old Wayne cases can be avoided as above
indicated. Otherwise, section 118 (a) must fail to the extent that it seeks to apply to causes of action arising outside of Maryland when suit is brought against a foreign
corporation that has not appointed a resident agent.
Because so much hinges upon the adoption or rejection of the view of Professor Beale and the Restatement
as to the effect of the Old Wayne and Simon cases, a word
might be said as to a further theoretical justification for
disposing of these cases as notice cases, one which is contrary to the Beale interpretation.
52

Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917).
National Can Co. v. Weirton Steel Co., 314 Ill. 280, 145 N. E. 389
(1924); Reynolds v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co., 228 Mass. 584, 117 N. E.
913 (1917); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., supra note 52; El Paso &
S. W. Co. v. Chisholm, 180 S. W. 156 (Tex. Cir. Ap. 1915) ; and a recent
strongly reasoned opinion rejecting the Simon case as not in point, Steele v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 206 N. C. 220, 173 S. E. 583, 96 A. L. R. 361
(1934). For a complete list of cases, see: 30 A. L. R. 255, 96 A. L. R. 366.
These two annotations indicate a strong majority view to the effect stated
In the text above, contrary to the position of the Restatement and Professor
Beale.
51 Hess v. Pawloskl, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. ed. 1091 (1927);
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. ed. 446 (1928).
55 See discussion of Sees. 105-109 infra circa note 107.
5
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The limited construction of Professor Beale gets a result inconsistent with the rules for assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that has qualified. That
is, if the corporation complies with the qualification statutes of a state, it may be subjected to suit for any cause
of action ;1 but if it does business in violation of the statute without so qualifying, it may be subjected to suit only
as to causes of action arising out of business done within
the state. It is hard to conceive of a good reason why the
non-complying corporation should have this premium
placed upon its misbehavior. The argument that where
there is compliance there is express consent (but not otherwise), overlooks the view, accepted by the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, that consent may be by acts or by words.5 7
If a state statute, in providing for suits against foreign
corporations doing business within the state, says that the
doing of business shall be construed to be an assent to its
terms,5 8 is there any good reason for saying such doing
of business is not an express consent to the type of service
provided for and for any cause of action provided the service is reasonably calculated to give notice? Being fundamentally a question of whether a corporation is deprived
of its property without due process of law, should not the
same criteria be used here as would be used in the situations of so called express consent cases where the corporation appoints the agent? Is not the question the same in
both instances; namely, whether it is an unconstitutional
condition of entry to do business to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of the courts for all purposes 719
Or, pursuing another line of approach, in terminology
already used by the courts, could it not be said the corporation doing a regular course of business in the state is
"present" there and that this provides a basis of jurisdiction similar to that provided by the presence of an individual. Hence, if proper notice is given, jurisdiction is
" Supra notes 12, 13 and 14.

67 Restatement, Secs. 81, 90.

11 Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 117 (as amended Laws 1937, Ch. 504) so provides.
50 Supra notes 15-17.
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appropriately exercised in any transitory cause of action
regardless of where it arose. If using the concept "presence" bothers anyone who cannot conceive of a corporation as being "present" in the sense that an individual
is, 0 eliminate that method of description. Recognize that
what one is looking for is a basis of jurisdictional power
in the state to subject the corporation to the processes
of its courts. Should it be any different than the contact
necessary for the state to legislate effectively with regard
to such corporation? Obviously not! Yet, it is recognized
that the state may pass and enforce laws requiring that
such foreign corporation doing business within the state
appoint an agent for receipt of service for all causes of
action and may attach penalties for non-compliance."1 If
such legislative power is present, the basis for it is the doing of business within the state.
It would seem that such doing business, regardless
of what it is called ("consent", "presence", or something
else) can logically be conceived of as creating a base
of jurisdiction or a control element broad enough for
the state to confer jurisdiction on its courts regardless
of where the cause of action arose. If the procedure
(notice) is in compliance with due process of law, the
state's exercise of jurisdiction should be valid for all
purposes. We acknowledge such power over an individual on the basis of domicil or citizenship regardless
of how little the individual is physically present within
the state. 2 Is the contact which the corporation makes by
60 Goodrich, op. cit. 8upra note 12, 176 reasons that since an Individual
is "present" only where he physically is and cannot be present in a state
because an agent acts there, the presence theory is weak for a corporation.
This, likewise, is answerable by the next few sentences in the text above.
"I Supra notes 12-14. Also, note (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1060, 1060-1065.
62Restatement,
Conflict of Laws (1934) Secs. 79, 80. The Maryland
courts have recognized this type of jurisdiction in enforcing foreign judgments based thereon (Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Maryland Annotations,
Secs. 79, 80). But there is no general statutory provision (nor have the
courts proceeded in absence of statute) for a personal jurisdiction in law
or equity after substituted service on a resident or citizen of Maryland
(Code provisions such as Art. 16, Sec. 134, 72 etc., seem to be generally
recognized as limited to proceedings in equity in rem). It Is submitted that
it would be desirable to have specific provision for personal judgments at
law or in equity after substituted service on resident defendants who could
not be served personally after reasonable effort to reach them. Any such
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carrying on a systematic course of business any less significant than that necessary for one of these two bases with
reference to individuals? It would seem not, and it is believed that for the sake of simplicity and consistency, the
conceptualism of treating corporate "presence" the same
as individual "presence" is justifiable.
It might well be argued that the State, in pursuance of
sound policy, should limit the jurisdiction it asserts over
causes of action arising outside of its borders so as not to
subject the foreign corporation to useless burdens. This
seems to be the justification offered by Professor Beale for
restricting jurisdiction based on the doing of business to
causes of action arising within the state, and is implicit
in the reasoning of the Simon case."
It is submitted
that this argument is one which is more appropriately directed at the extent to which the state should exercise its
power than to the existence of that power. It well might
be a reason why a state, in a liberal application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens 4 should refuse to exercise
its admitted jurisdiction, rather than argument that such
jurisdiction is altogether lacking. Certainly, it is an argument that has found no force as applied to natural persons. No one suggests that the inconvenience to the defendant precludes the assertion of jurisdictional power in
the courts of a state over an individual who is present in
the state at the time of service, no matter how casual the
presence happens to be. There is no greater reason for
limiting the power when exercised as to a foreign corporation.
statute, however, should provide for an attempt to use first the best forms
of substituted service (copy with member of family at last address, registered mail return receipt requested, etc.) with service by publication only
as a last resort (cf. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 37 S. Ct. 343, 61 L. ed.
608, L. R. A. 1917 F. 458 (1917).
6 Also in Judge Learned Hand's opinion, supra note 29.
6, This doctrine, not developed in Maryland, for such jurisdiction cases,
is treated in American decision and comment; Collard v. Beach, 81 App.
Div. 582, 81 N. Y. Supp. 619 (1903); Heine v. N. Y. Life Ins., 45 Fed. (2d)
426 (1930); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in AngloAmerican Law (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 1. It reposes discretion in the court
to refuse to exercise an admitted jurisdiction If on the facts of a given
case there is no sufficient reason for suit at the forum. It is suggested
that it might be an appropriate inclusion in a statute with as broad an
application as Sec. 118.
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Whatever the theoretical grounds in support of or
against the view as adopted by the Restatement and Professor Beale, whatever the holdings in the courts may indicate by numerical weight, there is a real possibility that
section 118 (a), in applying to causes of action arising outside of Maryland, may violate due process. Because of
this, it is suggested that the statute should have separately
classified jurisdiction asserted according to where the cause
of action arose, so that one bad portion of the statute would
not easily drag down the whole.6 5
A question might be raised as to the effect of the third
factor in section 118 (a), "resident or non-resident" plaintiff, as a due process factor. Until the present, it does not
seem to have had any controlling significance in the United
States Supreme Court cases and we are left largely to
speculation. It would seem that if the view is adopted
that jurisdiction may be asserted based merely on "doing
business" and be good for all causes provided adequate
notice is provided for the defendant, this factor has no
constitutional significance. And, if the Restatement-Beale
view of the Simon and Old Wayne cases is followed, the
fact that suit is precluded where the cause of action is foreign is not helped by the fact that the plaintiff is a resident.
It would seem, though, that the residence of the plaintiff
would be a definite factor in the reasonableness of the forum's hearing a suit against a foreign corporation and it
might yet become a due process factor. However, under
the view expressed earlier, it would seem that due process
ought to allow the doing of a regular and systematic course
of business as a sufficient basis of jurisdiction for any
cause of action; with the residence or non-residence of the
plaintiff, just as the cause of action being local or for65 Space has not permitted (and the scope of this article does not call
for) a discussion of the problem of separability In a statute which on its
face includes in the same wording both constitutional and unconstitutional
possibilities. There is a chance, however, that such a statute would fail
entirely. On this see Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the
Supreme Court (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 76. The danger may be eliminated
by the separability provision, Laws 1937, Ch. 504, Sec. 513, and it would
be a difficult task to draft a comprehensive law that would completely
avoid the danger.
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eign, operating solely as a factor to determine the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
As for the latter, though, the Maryland statute indicates no intention for its application. The wording seems
to leave the courts no discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction even though the plaintiff is a non-resident, the
cause of action arose elsewhere, and the foreign corporation is greatly inconvenienced by suit in the forum. Yet
in most such situations, there would be no good reason why
the Maryland court should be burdened with the suit. The
statute would express a wiser policy if the courts were
given some discretion to refuse to entertain such suits, although allowed to handle them if a sound policy should demand it. Of course, the courts might act without special
provision.
See. 118(a), Commerce Clause Objection, Qualifying or
Non-Qualifying Corporation
When the problem is raised as to the extent section
118 (a) causes an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce, the several factors of "doing business", "residence
of plaintiff", and "nature of the cause of action" all assume an immediate importance.
In the early case of InternationalHarvester Co. v. Kentuck y 66 the Supreme Court indicated that the corporation,
if "present" within the State, was not exempt from suit
solely because it was engaged in interstate commerce. However, it was later established that the commerce clause objection was nevertheless available if the assertion of jurisdiction operated as an unreasonable burden on such commerce. In Davis v. Farmers' Cooperative Equity Co.67
jurisdiction was asserted in Minnesota under a statute
which provided: "Any foreign corporation having an agent
in this state for the solicitation of freight and passenger
traffic or either thereof over its lines outside of this state,
may be served with summons by delivering a copy thereof to such agent." Suit was against the Director General
66
234
61262

U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. ed. 1479 (1914).
U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556, 67 L. ed. 996 (1923).
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of Railroads, as agent, for a cause of action arising in Kansas against the A. J. & 0. F. Rr. Co., a Kansas Corporation engaged in interstate transportation. It did not own
or operate any line in Minnesota; but it did maintain there
an agent for solicitation of traffic. The cause of action was
in no way related to Minnesota or with the soliciting agency
located there. Holding that the Minnesota statute violated the commerce clause if applied so as to allow jurisdiction on such facts, the Supreme Court through Justice
Brandeis said:
".. .It may be that a statute like that here assailed would be valid, although applied to suits in
which the cause of action arose elsewhere, if the transaction out of which it arose had been entered upon
within the state, or if the plaintiff was, when it arose,
a resident of the state. These questions are not before us, and we express no opinion upon them. But
orderly effective administration of justice clearly does
not require that a foreign carrier shall submit to a
suit in a -state in which the cause of action did not
arise, in which the transaction giving rise to it was
not entered upon, in which the carrier neither owns
nor operates a railroad, and in which the plaintiff does
not reside. The public and the carriers are alike interested in maintaining adequate, uninterrupted transportation service at reasonable cost. This common
interest is emphasized by Transportation Act 1920,
which authorizes rate increases necessary to ensure
to carriers efficiently operated a fair return on property devoted to the public use. .

.

. Avoidance of

waste, in interstate transportation, as well as maintenance of service, have become a direct concern of
the public. With these ends the Minnesota statute, as
here applied, unduly interferes. By requiring from
interstate carriers general submission to suit, it unreasonably obstructs, and unduly burdens, interstate
commerce.
Essentially the same sort of "burden" holding as was
involved in the Davis case, appeared in Atchison T. & S.
F. Ry. Co. v. Wells. 8 In later cases the United States Su68 265 U. S. 101, 44 S. Ct. 469, 68 L. ed. 928 (1924).
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preme Court has been inclined to be liberal in allowing
the assertion of jurisdiction over corporations engaged in
interstate commerce, against commerce clause objections,
if there is some good reason why suit should be brought
in the state in question-some reason sufficient to make it
"reasonable", 6 9 although "burdensome" to allow the suit.
Citizenship of the plaintiff, cause of action arising out of
business done within the state, or extensive operations in
the state by the defendant, 0 have all been held to be factors
tending to make the assertion of power reasonable although
the corporation engages in interstate commerce.
The latest case International Milling Company v.
Columbia Transp. Co. 7 1 summarized the cases on each
side and held that an attachment in Minnesota was not an
unreasonable burden under the facts of that case. The
plaintiff was a Delaware Corporation, but had its principal office in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Defendant was a
Delaware corporation, a carrier by water, with its principal office in Cleveland, Ohio. Its vessels traveled the
Great Lakes, stopped frequently at Duluth where it had
agents, a firm of vessel brokers. The plaintiff had loaded
a cargo of grain on one of the vessel's of the defendant's
predecessor for transportation and storage. The voyage
was between Chicago and Buffalo and at one of these points
or between them the grain was negligently handled with
damage to the plaintiff. Suit was brought by attachment of
one of the defendant's vessels while stopping at Duluth,
Minnesota. Thus the court was faced with foreign plaintiff, foreign corporation defendant, foreign cause of ac"' The cases referred to next all use a factual approach as to what makes
the burden "reasonable". For best discussion of all the cases until 1932,
see Farrier, 8upra note 44.
70Citizenship or Residence of Plaintiff and Cause of Action Arising Within
the State: State of Missouri ex rel. St. Louis B. & M. R. Co. v. Taylor, 266
U. S. 200, 45 S. Ct. 47, 69 L. ed. 247, 42 A. L. R. 1232 (1924) ("the plaintiff
is a resident of Missouri that is, has a usual place of business within the
state"); also, Denver & Rio Grande W. R. Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284, 42
S. Ct. 152, 76 L. ed. 295 (1931). "Operating in State": Hoffman v. Missouri
ex rel. Foraker, 274 U. S. 21, 47 S. Ct. 485, 71 L. ed. 905 (1927) ; also International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transit Co., 292 U. S. 511, 78 L. ed. 1396,
54 S. Ct. 797 (1934). For a table showing various combinations of these
factors, and an opinion as to the constitutional result of each combination,
see Farrier, op. cit. supra note 44, 390; Myerberg, op. cit. supra note 1.
71 Supra note 70.
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tion, but apparently allowed the facts of the plaintiff's
principal office in Minnesota, plus the defendant's carrying on substantial activities there to sustain the argument
of "reasonable" burden. Somewhere between this and
the Davis case the line must be drawn.
To the extent that the Maryland statute could, on its
face, catch a situation within that of the Davis case it allows for the imposition of an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce and is susceptible of an unconstitutional
application. If interpreted so as to include no such set
of facts, it is clearly constitutional as far as the "commerce clause" objection is concerned.
The Attorney General of Maryland has expressed an
opinion that the statute was not meant to extend any jurisdiction that would constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce, and that section 118 "as amended appears
to be no broader in substance than in its previous form."" 2
Such a definite prediction of constitutionality assumes that
the previous form of the -statute, if applied as broadly as
the words allowed, was free from commerce clause objection (which at best would be doubtful). The opinion could
rest upon a narrower construction of 118(a) than its words
indicate and an ignoring of the special difficulties raised by
118(b) and (c), upon which there is at present little definite authority. Or, it could rest, with reference to 118(a),
upon a construction that "doing business" by the corporation engaged in interstate commerce is sufficient without more to make suit against it a "reasonable burden".
While the Supreme Court cases cited above have used
"operating in the state" as a factor combining with either
"resident plaintiff" or "cause of action arising within
the state" to overcome the commerce clause objection, no
one of them has indicated that it would be sufficient of itself. Professor Farrier concludes, from state cases and
lower federal court cases, that "operating in the state"
has been accepted as sufficient to sustain jurisdiction
against commerce clause objection even where the plain72 Opinion of the Attorney General, The Daily Record, Sept. 10, 1937.
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tiff was non-resident and the cause of action arose outside of the forum. 8 Mr. Myerberg accepts Mr. Farrier's
conclusion to sustain the Maryland statute. 4 However, it
should be observed that the decisions did not uniformly
support Farrier's view, and it is not necessarily correct.
Also, as a due process matter the Old Wayne and Simon
cases, discussed above, might preclude application of the
statute unless the cause of action arises within the state.
And, even if the latter is not the case, "operating in the
state" sufficient to overcome the commerce clause objection
might conceivably call for considerably more activity than
would be necessary for "doing business" within the state
so as to preclude the due process objection. The latter is
not indicated by Farrier and seems to be completely overlooked by Myerberg, who uses Farrier's term "operating
in the state" as synonomous with "doing business" as
used in the Maryland statute.
The difficulty, of course, lies in the fact that section
118(a) uses the same term "doing business" as a basis
for the broad power asserted over both interstate and intrastate operation. To secure an interpretation of constitutional against the commerce clause objection, the subdivision might have to be construed as requiring much more
business activity within the state than would be necessary
to assert control over the corporation engaged in intrastate business, although control over the latter might be
desirable as based on less activity. It is submitted that
better draftsmanship would segregate in section 118(a)
the jurisdiction asserted over corporations engaged in in"' O'Brien v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 292 Fed. 379 (D. C. D. Ala.
1923); Harris v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 12 Fed. (2d) 487 (C. A. D. C.
1929); Witort v. Chicago, N. W. R. Co., 178 Minn. 261, 226 N. W. 934
(1929) ; Farrier, op. cit. supra note 44.
" Myerberg, op. cit. supra note 1.
" Iron City Produce Co. v. American Express Co., 22 Ohio App. 165, 153
N. U. 316 (1926); Panstwowe Zaklady Gravlozne v. Auto Ins. Co., 36 Fed.
(2d) 504 D. C. D. N. Y. 1928) ; and observe that the two New York decisions
cited by Farrier as supporting his position were subsequently reversed, one
on the very ground of undue burden on interstate commerce. N. V. Brood
En Beschuitfabrick v. Aluminum Co. of North America, 136 Misc. 349. 239
N. Y. S. 302 (1930), reversed In 231 App. Dlv. 693, 248 N. Y. S. 460 (1931) ;
Murnan v. Wabash Ry. Co., 220 App. Div. 218, 221 N. Y. S. 332 (1927), reversed in 246 N. Y. 244, 158 N. E. 508 (1927).
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terstate activity from that with reference to corporations
engaged in intrastate activity.
The cases have not yet raised the question whether a
corporation by qualifying ("registering" under the Maryland act) under a state statute could consent (and thereby waive any right to object) to unreasonable burdens imposed on its interstate business. 76 The closest we have to
a holding is probably the case of Atchison T. & S. F. Ry.
Co. v. Wells 77 where the Supreme Court allowed the commerce clause to be asserted in the Federal courts to restrain enforcement of a state judgment obtained by default. Although the point was not argued, this is a tacit
recognition that the objection was not waived because not
used as a defense to the state proceeding. It might be
argued from this that it could not be waived by the appointment of an agent for receipt of service. This would
seem to be the purport of clear language in another Supreme Court case, decided on other subject matter, indicating that the imposition of such burden would be an unconstitutional condition not accepted by qualification.7 8
This is consistent with our earlier analysis of the due
process problem.7 9 A special argument in favor of allowing the objection to be raised after qualification is that an
individual (corporation) should not be allowed (by "registration" or otherwise) to waive the effect of a constitutional protection imposed for the benefit of the national
transportation system and the nation at large. However,
71 In the opinion of the Attorney General, The Daily Record, Nov. 10,
1937, the question is answered by the statement that "registration" under
the statute is not meant to subject the corporation to any jurisdiction not
asserted in the absence of registration, that no attempt is made "to exact
from the corporation a consent to be sued In this state in actions in which
it could not be sued". If the statute receives this construction when a
corporation that has registered Is sued and raises objection that some
subdivision of See. 118 Is too burdensome on Interstate commerce, the ensuing discussion In the text Is pointless. However, "registering" under such
a statute is capable of being construed as a consent to the jurisdiction asserted as against "due process" objection (supra note 13) and the text Is
raising the quaere whether, if a similar holding should occur here, It can
be effective against "commerce clause" objection.
7265 U. S. 101, 44 S. Ct. 469, 68 L. ed. 928 (1924) and see discussion
Foster, op. cit. supra note 44, 1235.
71 Power Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 496, 47 S. Ct.
678, 71 L. ed. 1165 (1927) quoted supra note 16.
79 Supra circa note 16.
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until the question is definitely determined, there is the possibility that a corporation might weaken its position by
80
"registering" under the Maryland statute.
Sxc. 118(B)

AND

(C),

CONTINUANCE OF JURISDICTION

Due Process Objection
Subdivisions (b) and (c), from the general set-up of
section 118, seem directed mainly to the continuance of
jurisdiction after the corporation has ceased to do business in the state. However, their wording is such that they
apply "whether or not such foreign corporation shall have
ceased to do business in this state". While this results
in a definite overlapping with subdivision (a) as to suits
brought while a corporation is still doing business in Maryland, it is a fortunate wording in that certain types of
jurisdiction asserted in each of subdivisions (b) and (c)
might stand up against constitutional objection, as applied to corporations still doing business in Maryland although failing for some reason under subdivision (a). Subdivision (b) purports to apply only to causes of action
arising out of business done in Maryland, but allows for
the plaintiff to be either resident or non-resident. Subdivision (c) applies to all causes of action (arising "within or without this state") if the plaintiff is a "resident"
or "has a usual place of business in this State". Each
has, accordingly, a definite sphere of action; each overlaps with (a) and to a certain extent with the other; but
their combined effect is to assert a jurisdiction less than
that allowed for in (a), except for continuing it after "doing business" ceases.
The extent to which subdivision (b) and (c) may operate is determinable, therefore, by reviewing the constitutional limitations as already discussed for (a), and considering whether the attempt to continue jurisdiction after
withdrawal from the state by the corporation adds any
tenable objection. As applied to the corporation which has
O But cf. the opinion of the Attorney General, supra note 75. Observe
that the question posed by the text Is one of constitutionality of a broader
interpretation of the statute than the Attorney General deemed likely.
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qualified and appointed the resident agent, and is still doing business in Maryland, both are probably beyond due
process attack. 81 For the non-qualifying corporation, subdivision (b) in limiting its effect to causes of action arising out of business done in Maryland would seem to be
within the "due process" limitation even under the stricter interpretation of the Old Wayne and Simon cases, as
followed by the Restatement, unless some special significance attaches to the continuance of power after withdrawal. Subdivision (c), however, since it expressly covers
causes of action arising outside of as well as within the
state must meet the objections of the strict interpretations
of the Simon and Old Wayne cases.8 2 If they preclude jurisdiction based on "doing business" as to causes of action
arising outside of the state, then subdivision (c) fails by
so much, as being in violation of due process of law, without consideration of the doubt raised by its attempts to
continue power after the corporation has withdrawn.
The constitutional effect of this attempt to continue
jurisdiction after the corporation has ceased to do business
is not ascertainable for all purposes from the decided cases.
Washington v. Superior Court,8 8 in the Supreme Court of
the United States, would seem to be sufficient basis for the
constitutionality of both subdivisions as applied to corporations which have qualified or registered as provided by
section 119 (except that the possibility of commerce clause
objection is not eliminated by it). s3a
In that case a Delaware corporation qualified in 1926
to do business in Washington and, pursuant to the applicable statute, appointed an agent for receipt of service. In
1929, the company withdrew from the state, ceased to do
business there and was dissolved in accordance with the
laws of Delaware. The appointment of the Washington
agent was never revoked; but, in 1929, he removed to Cali81Discussion supra circa notes 11-17. The discussion of unconstitutional
conditions would be relevant here; although Washington v. Superior Court
may be an indication of reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court to
apply the doctrine to a service problem.
82 Supra notes 38-43.
" 289 U. S. 361, 53 S. Ct. 624, 77 L. ed. 1250 (1933).
8
3a But Cf. supra, notes 11-17.
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fornia. In 1932, an action was begun in the Washington
courts naming the Delaware Company as one of the def endants and summons and complaint were served on the Secretary of State, as allowed by the Washington statute in the
event of the Company's withdrawal. No notice of this was
forwarded by the Secretary of State, or anyone else, to the
Delaware Company. In a contest on this proceeding, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Washington
statute's provisions were validly applicable to a corporation which had consented thereto by its original compliance.
While there is probably a construction preference for
limiting the effect of such statutes to causes of action arising within the state, 4 it would seem to be reasonably safe to
assume that the express consent resulting from qualification or the appointment of an agent will be allowed to operate as broadly as the statute calls for. 5 The Maryland
statute, particularly, since it provides for good notice and
retains power only as to causes of action arising out of
business done within the state, or else where the plaintiff
is a resident or has a usual place of business within the
state, would seem to raise little objection as applied to the
consenting corporation under the decisions to date.
This being true, there would seem to be no plausible
practical or business reason for refusing the continuance of
jurisdiction as attempted with reference to the corporation
engaged in intrastate business that has not qualified. However, there is less support for it in the decisions and it is a
misfit under the generally accepted theories of jurisdiction.
Professor Beale in his recent treatise says :s
"If the foreign corporation has not been required
to designate and has not designated a particular agent
to receive service of process, and can be sued, if at all,
only under a statute providing for suit against a foreign corporation by service of process upon agents of
a certain sort, since 'implied consent' to be sued under
Chipman v. Jeffery, 251 U. S. 373, 40 S. Ct. 172, 64 L. ed. 314 (1920) ;
Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Construction Co., 257 U. S.
213, 42 S. Ct. 84, 66 L. ed. 201 (1921).
85 Supra notes 12-17, and 84. Cf. also: Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 47 L. ed. 987, 23 S. Ct. 707 (1903) to the
effect that the corporation may not destroy the power by withdrawing its
appointment.
88 Op. cit. 8upra note 12; Sec. 93, 1, p. 409.
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such a statute is derived from doing business in the
state, the corporation no longer gives assent when it
ceases to do business in the state. In such a case,
therefore, the foreign corporation cannot be sued after
it has ceased to do business in the state."
However, his position is not supported by the authority
cited for it 11 and would seem to be contrary to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,8 8 which reads:
"A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which has done business within the state but has ceased to do business at
the time of service of process, as to causes of action
arising out of business done within the state, if, by the
law of the state at the time when the business was done,
the corporation by doing business in the state subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the state to that
extent."
There is some case authority 9 tending to support this
view of the Restatement and it is submitted that it is sound.
There would seem to be nothing so "unreasonable" in this
continuing jurisdiction as to involve a violation of due process of law. And, if some theoretical conceptual explanation is necessary, it may be said that the doing of each act
out of which each suit arises is sufficient basis of jurisdictional power to cover any objection that the corporation,
by ceasing to do business, has removed the only existing
90
source of state power over it.
" In three cases cited (Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406,
23 S.Ct. 728, 47 L. ed. 1113 (1903) ; Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works. 190
U. S.428, 23 S.Ct. 807, 47 L. ed. 1122 (1903) ; Cady v. Associated Colonies,
119 F. 420 (1902)), the statutes did not expressly provide for continuance
of jurisdiction after withdrawal; in Thurn v. Pyke, 8 Ida. 11, 66 P. 157
(1901), the type of statute involved and the type of service used are not
sufficiently clear to make the case a good holding; in Gabouri v. Central
Vt. Ry. Co., 250 N. Y. 233, 165 N. E. 275 (1929) the cause of action arose
outside of the forum and part of the opinion Indicates a view in support
of allowing continuing jurisdiction in the appropriate case; Baker v.
Walker S. & B., 18 N. S. Wales W. N. 282 (1901) is a note opinion, too brief
to be clear but seeming to rest on a doctrine peculiar to the court involved
in claiming jurisdiction only over "resident" companies.
81Sec. 93.
80American Ry.Express Co. v. Royster Guano Co., 273 U. S.274. 47 S.Ct.
355, 71 L. ed. 642 (1927) ; Boggs v. Mining Co., 105 Md. 371, 66 AtI. 259
(1907) ; Ben Franklin Ins. Co. v. Gillett, 54 Md. 212 (1880). There are
probably cases in other states.
"0Of course, this depends upon the validity of the doing of an act basis
of jurisdiction discusssed infra with reference to Sec. 118 (d).
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This reasoning, and the Restatement section referred to,
can apply, however, only to subdivision (b). When we look
at subdivision (c), we find that it applies to all causes and
hence goes beyond the Restatement and the reasoning to
support it. The problem presented would seem to be,
(granted that the Simon and Old Wayne cases do not apply),"1 whether this protection for the benefit of residents
and those with a usual place of business in Maryland is
reasonable (and hence due process) as over against the
inconvenience caused to the foreign corporation in forcing
it to defend where it no longer has any association and
where the cause of action has no contact except through
the plaintiff's relation to the forum. The answer would
seem to be uncontrolled by decided law.
The conclusion must be that while subdivisions (b) and
(c), like subdivision (a), are probably valid against due
process objection when applied to corporations that have
qualified and appointed the resident agent, they raise several questions as to their constitutionality when applied to
non-qualifying corporations. The possible limitation that
jurisdiction may not, in this latter instance, be extended to
other than causes of action arising within the state; the
argument (as found in the quotation from Beale above)
that continuance of jurisdiction is impossible because the
basis of all jurisdiction is gone; the further argument that,
granted it may be continued as to causes of action arising
out of business done within the state, there is definitely no
basis of power for extending it further, must all be met and
answered successfully before subdivisions (b) and (c) can
be sustained in their entirety against the due process objection.
It would seem that, as a matter of reasonableness, all
but the last argument can be met successfully. That one,
which goes to the continuance of jurisdiction as allowed by
subdivision (c), presents the most difficult question to determine as a matter of social policy, aside from any hazards
raised by inability to comply with existing concepts of
01 If the Beale-Restatement view of those cases is followed, obviously subdivision (c) fails, as indicated supra notes 38-41.
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jurisdictional theory.92 Detailed drafting so as to segregate a little more clearly the types of jurisdiction allowed
might be helpful.
Sec. 118(b) and (c), Commerce Clause Objection
The possible commerce clause objection to subdivisions
(b) and (c) follows from the same cases discussed with
reference to subdivision (a). The same principle applies,
namely: Do the reasons of policy in favor of allowing jurisdiction on the facts of each particular case make the
burden reasonable when weighed against the possible obstruction to interstate business? But, under (b) and (c),
the continuance of jurisdiction after the corporation has
ceased to do business in the state is definitely an additional
factor on the burden side. It is no longer as convenient for
the corporation to defend. It might be argued, accordingly, that the reasons for asserting jurisdiction need be
stronger in order to make the obvious burden a reasonable
one.
How does this apply? Subdivision (b) in limiting jurisdiction to causes of action arising out of business done
in Maryland has seized upon a factor which has been generally accepted as making the burden reasonable in all
cases where the corporation was still doing business in the
forum. There could be a question whether if the same
would be true after it had ceased to do business. It would
seem that validity would be least questionable if the plaintiff were a resident, more questionable if some lesser contact with the forum existed, and most questionable if there
were no contact of the plaintiff with the forum other than
his instituting suit there. Accordingly, a more desirable
form of statute would be one which acknowledged this by
segregating under subdivision (b): (1) suits by resident
plaintiffs; (2) suits by plaintiffs with usual place of business in Maryland; (3) suits by all other plaintiffs. There
would be more possibility of separability should any one
or more, but not all, of the above situations constitute an
92 It might be observed that the rationale of having the same result for
qualifying as non-qualifying corporations under Sec. 118 (a) is applicable
to subdivisions (b) and (c) (supra circa notes 11-17).
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unreasonable burden on interstate commerce 2 a This suggestion is merely combining with (b) the theory that obviously lies behind (c), that there is more reason for protecting residents and those with business in the forum than
other plaintiffs.
This line of attack indicates the analysis of subdivision
(c). In allowing continuance of jurisdiction in favor of
"residents" or those with a "usual place of business" in
Maryland it, too, has seized upon factors which seem to
have been recognized as making the burden reasonable as
to the corporation engaged in business within the state."
Their being segregated relieves (c) of the re-drafting suggestion made for (b). The only problem is whether they
can of themselves hold the scales on the reasonableness
side as against the added burden of continuance after withdrawal. Something is to be said for the fact that the statute limits jurisdiction to causes arising while the corporation was doing business in Maryland.
Recent law review comment on these very suggestions
indicates that the usual concepts used to justify continuance of jurisdictions (such as the right of a state to impose
conditions based on the power to exclude) may break down
when applied to the corporation engaged in interstate business solely.94 It would seem that this is an indication of the
inherent weakness of the concepts rather than an indication that the attempted continuance of power is necessarily
bad. The factual approach of reasonable or unreasonable
burden seems to be the proper analysis to apply, recognizing that the jurisdictional power carries over from the business originally done. Obviously, though, a greater conceptual difficulty occurs with reference to (c) than (b) in such
case, and (c) is accordingly of more doubtful validity.
No separation has been made here between the qualifying and non-qualifying corporation because the discussion
under subdivisions (a) and (b) inevitably carries over and
leaves no room for further comment.
"2a See supra note 65.
" Supra notes 70-72.
"1Note (1938) 38 Col.. 1060, 1075. Observe on p. 1072 of the same comment an interesting analysis of the several situations for continuance of
jurisdiction that may arise under subdivisions (b) and (c).
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SEC. 118(D), JURISDICTIO N BASED ON DOING AN ACT

Due Process Objection
Subdivision (d)allows a "resident" or person having a
"usual place of business" in Maryland to sue on any cause
of action arising from a contract made or liability incurred
for acts done within the state, "whether or not such
foreign corporation is doing or has done business in this
state." This is an apparent attempt to extend to corporations a basis of jurisdictional power recently recognized for
natural persons ;95 but to extend it in a more extensive fashion than has as yet been recognized in any opinions of the
courts.
As a bar to the validity of subdivision (d) there stand
repeated statements of the courts to the effect that in the
absence of "consent" or "doing business" there is no
basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over the foreign
corporation. 6 Further, the cases dealing with natural persons, in their language, have restricted the allowed jurisdiction in each case to the special facts dealt with. 97 This
statute asserts power in the courts for all purposes.
What can be said in favor of this new and unique provision of the law? As applied to non-resident individuals,
state statutes have been sustained in the United States
Supreme Court asserting judicial control over non-resident
motorists as to causes of action arising from negligent
operation of an automobile on the state highways9 s and as
to causes of action arising out of the sale of corporate securities through an agent in a state. 9 In each instance
there was emphasized that the notice provided for must
95Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. ed. 1091 (1927) ;
Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. ed. 1097 (1935) ; cf.
Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-residents Doing Business Within the State

(1919) 32 Har. L. Rev. 871; Cheatham, Dowling, and Goodrich, Cases on
Conflict of Laws (1936) 99-105.
96 Supra notes 18-24.
97

Supra note 95.

98 Hess v. Pawloski, supra note 95; and see for similar statute in Md.
Code Supp., Art. 56, Secs. 187 (c), 190 A & B, specifically applying to: "a
non-resident, individual, firm, or corporation".
o1Doherty v. Goodman, supra note 95.
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be adequate.' 00 In at least one case, 10 1 a non-resident motorist law has been applied to a foreign corporation without
objection being raised on the ground that it was not suable
in the state because not doing business there.
If such statutes are reasonable and constitutional as
applied to non-resident individuals, there seems to be nothing that would make them unreasonable as applied to foreign corporations. They represent situations not visualized
at the time the courts enunciated the broad rule that there
was no jurisdiction over a corporation not doing business
in the state although service was on a corporate agent or
official within the state and suit arose out of the very transaction in which he was then engaged. 0 2 The old cases do
not stand as authority on this new development. They were
not decided under statutes which attempted to assert (and
at the same time limit) jurisdiction as to causes of action
arising out of the particular act done. They were attempting to assert a general personal jurisdiction based on the
doing of business as a contact sufficient to support it.
The distinction must be drawn between jurisdiction
based on "doing business" (in the sense of a continuous
course of transactions, establishing offices, etc.) which reasonably may be held to give power to adjudicate any transitory cause of action (or at least any cause arising within
the state), and jurisdiction based on the doing of an act (or
several acts not amounting to "doing business") with jurisdictional power limited to causes arising out of that very
act (or acts). There has been no consideration of the latter as applied to corporations, at least with the distinction
clearly in mind. The only authority is in the cases dealing
with individuals. The question of its extension to corporations must be answered by determining whether it is unrea100

Cf. Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 A. 547 (1930).

101 Poti v. New England Machinery Co., 83 N. H. 238, 140 A. 587 (1928).

Cf. Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 12, 178-179; observe that the Maryland
statute as amended by Laws 1937, Ch. 504, provides that nothing therein
is meant to limit the applicability of Md. Code, Art. 56, Sees. 190, A and B,
of the Non-resident Motorists law. Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 105. This would
indicate that if 118 (d) fails for any reason, the application of the nonresident motorists law to a foreign corporation is contemplated. The reasoning of the text of this article is pertinent to that law also.
10
2 Supra notes 18-24.
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sonable to subject the foreign corporation to similar control. It is not apparent why such assertion of power is
any less reasonable as applied to corporations than as
applied to individuals.
Granting the validity of such jurisdiction, however, in
the case of certain acts (such as dealt with in non-resident
motorist laws or blue-sky laws), a question might be raised
as to whether it may extend to any kind of act done within
the state. Section 85 of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
apparently based on the above cases dealing with natural
persons, says:
"If a State cannot, without violating the Constitution of the United States, make the doing of certain
kinds of acts within the state illegal unless and until
the person doing the acts or causing them to be done
has consented to the jurisdiction of the courts of the
State as to causes of action arising out of such acts,
the State cannot validly provide that the doing of acts
shall subject him to the jurisdiction of the courts of
the State."
This language is somewhat difficult to construe, but if
it is meant to allow the extension of jurisdiction only as
to acts which the state may prohibit, we must disagree with
it, despite some language in the cases which might tend to
support it. 10 Recent comment would indicate that the section was purposely left indefinite, so as to care for further
development (such as occurred after publication of the Restatement in the case of Doherty & Co. v. Goodman), but
that there is some limit on the state's power (it cannot
extend to all acts). This idea of some limit is drawn from
the language of the two Supreme Court cases. Mr. Justice
Butler in Hess v. Pawloski mentioned the peculiar dangers
involved in motor vehicle regulation, and Mr. Justice McReynolds in the Goodman case spoke of the special regulations applicable in Iowa to sellers of corporate securities.
However, that the language of a case restricts its holding to the facts in hand would not indicate that the principle
103 Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289, 39 S. Ct. 97, 63 L. ed. 250 (1919);
Hess v. Pawloski, and Doherty v. Goodman, both supra note 95.
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involved cannot extend to cover other situations. What
should be avoided is the too-narrow crystalization of the
principle at its inception. It should be remembered that
the earliest assertions of jurisdiction over foreign corporations were justified on the basis of the power to exclude
and yet that power to exclude was not a necessary jurisdictional factor in the later developments. It happened to
be the most convenient tool within reach. The same might
be the situation as to the court's first treatment of jurisdiction based upon the doing of acts. Accordingly, it
would be preferable to admit that the doing of an act within
the state may be the basis for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation (or individual) as
to causes of action arising out of such act to the extent
that it is reasonable exercise of the state's regulatory control under all of the facts involved.
Such an approach faces squarely the problem of whether
the making of an ordinary contract in the state by a foreign
corporation (or non-resident individual) with a citizen of
the state could be made the basis of securing personal jurisdiction over the non-resident as to a suit arising out of
such contract. 1 4 Much could be said by way of social justification for such a result. First, it is one that has been
accepted in other civilized countries. 1 5 Secondly, the state,
from the point of view of conflict of laws in seeking such
a jurisdiction has two interests involved: (a) a jurisdictional interest to allow its own citizen the convenience of
litigating in his own state a dispute arising out of a contract made with him in his own state; (b) from the choiceof-law angle, to take jurisdiction so as to be certain that
the contract is controlled by the law which it feels is applicable. Thirdly, from the standpoint of reasonableness, convenience to the resident plaintiff should weigh as heavily
as the inconvenience to the foreign corporation, and the
scales should be tipped in favor of due process when we
It is to be observed that the cases to date have dealt only with causes
of action arising in tort. See: Cheatham, Dowling, and Goodrich, op. cit.
supra note 95, 99-106; note (1938) 38 Col. 1060, 1078.
...Cheatham, Dowling, and Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 95; Culp, Process
in Actions Against Non-residents Doing Business Within a State (1934) 32
Mich. L. Rev. 909.
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consider along with the convenience to the plaintiff the
fact that the defendant corporation came to the jurisdiction
to contract with the plaintiff. The last would seem to be a
controlling factor to support any jurisdiction based on the
doing of an act, and the limits of past or present conceptualism should not blind the courts to it.
Since conceptualism does play a large part in judicial
decision, it might be observed that one conceptualistic attack on the "doing of an act" basis of jurisdiction as applied to individuals is not available against it when used
for a corporation engaged in intra-state business. It has
been stated in judicial opinion, and approved elsewhere,
that since the individual may not be excluded from contracting (doing business) in a state, his contract may not be
made the basis of a jurisdiction otherwise absent. °6 This
argument cannot apply to corporations, because it is
granted, since the earliest decisions, that the state does
have power to exclude.
It is submitted, that whatever the theoretical or conceptual argument that may need to be raised to support it,
subdivision (d) represents a sound social policy and should
be sustainable against the due process objection.
Sec. 118(d), Commerce Clause Objection.
As for the commerce clause objection, the road is even
less charted than in the due process field. The answer lies
in an analysis of the cases referred to earlier for subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) ; and, in the application of the rule
that on the facts of each case it must be determined whether
the convenience to the resident plaintiff and the fact that
the cause of action arose out of a transaction in the state
out-weighs the burden imposed by the inconvenience to the
corporation engaged in interstate commerce of being forced
to defend where it has no offices and does no regular business. It would seem, though, that interstate commerce
should not be encouraged to the extent of allowing corpora106Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289, 39 S. Ct. 97, 63 L. ed. 250 (1919) ; but
observe that this holding is cut down considerably by Doherty v. Goodman,
294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. ed. 1097 (1935).
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tions to act where they are unwilling to answer in the
courts for such acts. If that be true, and if our reasoning
on the due process side is sound, subdivision (d) should be
entirely sustainable. However, there should be more definite segregation of the jurisdiction over corporations engaged in interstate commerce as against those engaged in
10 7
intra-state commerce.
SECS. 105-109-NoTCE PiovIsioNs
The means of service on the foreign corporation' are
set forth in sections 105-109, as amended. They would
seem to raise little problem of doubtful constitutionality,
although there may be some question whether the sections
are drafted so as to care adequately for the type of jurisdiction provided for in section 118 (d). The provisions are
substantially as follows:
1. Service may be made upon the 'resident agent'
appointed for receipt of service by the foreign corporation as called for by section 119.19
2. If an unsuccesful attempt to serve the resident
agent has been made, or if there is no resident agent,
service may be made upon "the president, manager,
secretary or treasurer of such corporation, or upon
any director, vice president, assistant secretary or
assistant treasurer thereof, and if none of the above
resides in this state, such process may be served upon
any agent or other person expressly or impliedly authorized to accept such service."" 0
117 And possibly segregation of causes of action arising in tort from causes
of action arising in contract, since on the cases dealing with individuals
only the former have received recognition; see supra note 104.
"I Space has not permitted a comparison with the former means of
service. The comment by Mr. Myerberg, supra note 1, does this and it
may be done by placing the old code section beside the new.
109 Sec. 105 (a).
110 See. 105 (b). This and succeeding provisions of the law seem to
eliminate the problem raised by those cases which held that where the
statute calls for the appointment of an agent and the corporation complies,
service on some other person would be insufficient; see: Oland v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 69 Md. 248, 14 A. 669 (1885) ; Beale, op. cit. supra note 12,
See. 91.3. The Maryland case just cited may still be law on its particular
holding as applied to insurance companies, or any companies given similar
special treatment and not covered by the general corporation law.
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3. If two unsuccesful attempts have been made to
serve the resident agent, or there is no resident agent,
service may be made upon the State Tax Commission,
which service shall be deemed to be "equivalent to
personal service upon a resident agent or other agent
or officer of such corporation," with the duty imposed
on the state tax commission "to forward by registered
mail" etc."' However, this mode of service seems
to be limited to "any corporation of this State, or any
foreign corporation required by2 any statute of this
State to have a resident agent."1
4. If there is no resident agent, or after two unsuccessful attempts to serve process upon the resident
agent, proceedings may be had by way of attachment
the same as against a non-resident individual."'
So far as they go, these provisions for notice seem to be
carefully drawn and in the eyes of the writer raise no valid
constitutional objection. It is clear that in the absence of
"consent" to the exercise of jurisdiction without notice," 4
a form of notification reasonably calculated to reach the defendant must be used to obtain good jurisdiction over an
individual or a corporation."" The Maryland statute, however, would seem definitely to stay within the requirements
of what is reasonable. The service on the State Tax Commission method may be used only after two unsuccessful
attempts to find the resident agent, or in the absence of the
appointment of a resident agent, and even so the commission must take steps to notify the defendant by registered
111 The statute should be referred to for the details of this.
A proper
approach is taken to the notice problem in proceeding from the type of
notice most likely to reach the defendant through intermediate means to
that least likely to reach him. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90. 37 S. Ct.
343, 61 L. ed. 608, L. R. A. 1917 F. 458 (1917).
112

Sec. 105 (d).

113Sec. 105 (d), which, when read along with Sec. 11 of Ch. 504 of Md.
Laws 1937 (repealing and reenacting Code Art. 9, Sec. 2) has the effect
of establishing the only means of attachment proceeding against a foreign
corporation, contracting the old law for foreign corporations, although
extending the means of attachment against domestic corporations). Cf.
Myerberg, op. cit. supra note 1.
"" Such consent may clearly be given as an express consent, Wagner
v. Scurlock, 166 Md. 284, 170 A. 539 (1934) ; Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
and Maryland Annotations, Secs. 75, 81. It would seem that the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions, supra note 16, might impose some limitation
upon forcing such consent as a condition of entry to do business.
I's Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sees. 75, 87 (b).
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mail.116 This method of notification has been approved for
individuals and would seem to be sufficient for corpora7

tions."
In the section allowing for service on the President,
Secretary, Treasurer, etc., after one attempt to serve the
resident agent, there would seem to be no defect. This
type of notice would be good without any requirement of
serving the resident agent first" 8 and hence would seem to
lose nothing because made a secondary method of giving
notice. The only quaere would be whether the statute,
in its wording, allows service to be made on such a minor
agent of the company that notice to him would not be
deemed to be notice to the company, and so there would
result a violation of due process. 1 9 It would seem that the
statute itself precludes this when it says "any agent or
other person expressly or impliedly authorized to accept
service." The statute naturally would be construed to exclude from "impliedly authorized to accept service" those
employees a service upon whom would violate due process.
But while the statute in its provisions for notice is probably constitutional, it would seem that the draftsmen have
left it extremely doubtful whether there is a means of service sufficient to care for the important type of jurisdiction
allowed by section 118 (d) (jurisdiction based on the doing of an act). It would seem that the usual case where
a plaintiff would want to use section 118 (d) would be one
where the foreign corporation would not have appointed
a resident agent and where it would not be likely to have
a responsible corporate agent in the state. Accordingly,
...The statute (Sees. 108, 109) makes no provision as to what is to be
the effect of a refusal of the corporation to receipt for the registered mail
or of a failure of the postal service to find the Company at the mailing
address. The effect of the sections read together, however, would seem to
be that the forwarding of the registered mail is sufficient. Some due
process quaere might be raised. For the effect of similar provisions in
non-resident motorists laws, see Culp, Recent Developments in Actions
Against Non-resident Motorists (1938) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 58, and the earlier
article (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 325.
117 Supra note 16; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. ed.
1091 (1927) ; Cf. Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 A. 547 (1930).
11" Beale, op. cit. supra note 12, Sec. 91.6; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v.
Eichberg, 107 Md. 363, 372, 68 A. 690, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 389 (1908) ; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Maryland Annotations, Sees. 91, 92.
"Is Beale, op. cit. supra note 12, 9L5; Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Elchberg, supra note 118.
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the plaintiff would have to look for some other means of
service under our statute, the only other means of service
being through the State Tax Commission.
However, section 105 (d), in providing for service upon
the State Tax Commission, limits itself to foreign corporations "required by any statute of this state to have a resident agent." If this means what it says, there is no means
of service provided to cover the type of case that is most
likely to arise under 118 (d), unless the provision of section
119 dealing with when corporations must appoint resident
agents is construed to cover all corporations doing any act
in Maryland. This construction of section 119 would seem
unlikely because its terminology refers only to corporations
"doing business" in Maryland, which term has generally
120
been held to mean more than the doing of a single act.
Also, it would seem of doubtful constitutionality to require
qualification of corporations for the doing of a single act
in the state although it might be justifiable to assert control
over them through the courts.1
Accordingly, it is suggested that the service provisions
should include a statement to extend the forms of notice
allowed for specifically to cover corporations subject to control under 118 (d), even though they are not corporations
which need qualify under section 119.
120Supra, notes 19-21.
121It is clearly possibly that to require the burden of qualification and

effects thereof because of the doing of a single act would be unreasonable
and violate due process, although allowing jurisdiction in the courts would
not be.

